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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the ad-
vantages of lab and field experiments. The experiment is conducted in the
lab but using an unchanged market environment from the real world. More-
over, a subset of the standard subject pool is used, containing those subjects
who have experience in conducting transactions in that market environment.
This guarantees the test of the theoretical predictions in a highly controlled
environment and at the same time enables not to miss the specific features
of economic behavior exhibited in the field. We apply the proposed type of
experiment to study seller behavior in online auctions with a Buy-It-Now fea-
ture, where early potential bidders have the opportunity to accept a posted
price offer from the seller before the start of the auction. Bringing the field
into the lab, we invited eBay buyers and sellers into the lab to participate
in a series of auctions on the eBay platform. We investigate how traders’
experience in a real market environment influences their behavior in the lab
and whether abstract lab experiments bias subjects’ behavior.
JEL classifications: C72, C91, D44, D82.
Keywords: Online Auctions, Experiments, Buyout Prices
1 introduction
When auctions are conducted in the laboratory, one usually uses abstract
terminology in instructions, abstract goods, and induced valuations. While
this approach ensures a very reliable test of the theory in a highly controlled
environment, its relevance for predicting behavior in the field is limited.
In field experiments economists use subjects from the field, field goods, and
field context. The observed behavior in such experiments often reveals key
features of economic transactions that cannot be seen in the lab. However,
one characteristic of field experiments compared to lab experiments is that
deviations from the theoretical predictions might be an artifact due to the
loss of control in the field and the fact that in a field experiment one cannot
guarantee that all assumptions of the theoretical models are satisfied.
In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the ad-
vantages of both, lab and field experiments. We propose to bring the field
into the lab. This guarantees the test of the theoretical predictions in a
highly controlled environment and at the same time enables not to miss the
specific features of economic behavior exhibited in the field. The experiment
is conducted in the lab, using an unchanged market environment from the
real world. Moreover, a subset of the standard subject pool is used, contain-
ing subjects who have experience in conducting transactions in that market
environment.
We apply the proposed type of experiment to study seller behavior in single
unit auctions preceded by a negotiation stage, i.e. where early buyers have
the opportunity to buy the item for sale at a pre-specified price prior to the
auction. The reason for the growing interest in this and similar mechanisms
is their use by many internet auction platforms. For example, eBay, Ama-
zon, and Yahoo, the biggest online auction platforms, use such a feature,
albeit with different characteristics. Whereas eBay’s “Buy-It-Now” (hence-
forth called “BIN”) price can only be accepted as long as no standard bids
have been submitted, the BIN price on Yahoo Auctions may be accepted
throughout the auction. In this paper, we focus on eBay’s BIN option.
We invited students who have already used the eBay platform into the lab
to participate in real eBay auctions. Therefore, participants bring experi-
ence with the task of the experiment and knowledge of the trading institu-
tion. Moreover, certain information concerning their previous trading activ-
ities can be used for the analysis. This implies two substantial advantages
over standard lab experiments. First, one would expect that field experience
could play a major role in helping individuals make their decisions. We can
answer the question how traders’ experience on eBay influences subjects’
behavior in the lab. Second, we can check whether abstract lab experiments
bias subjects’ behavior and investigate in which way behavior on eBay differs
compared to behavior in standard lab experiments.
However, our eBay experiment is not a standard field experiment. Using the
taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), our eBay experiment might be classi-
fied as a “framed field experiment” since there is field context in the task and
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the information set that subjects can use. However, Harrison and List’s de-
finition of “framed field experiment” assumes a nonstandard subject pool.
Moreover, in our setting, we keep essential characteristics of a conventional
lab experiment and avoid the loss of control which is inevitable for a field
experiment. Another advantage of our experiment compared to field exper-
iments is that we run several rounds and can observe changes in behavior
over time, as is usually done in standard lab experiments.
To sum up, our eBay experiment combines the advantages of both lab and
field experiments. It might be considered as the first step towards the de-
velopment of an “ideal” experiment, in the sense that we are able to observe
subjects in a controlled setting but where they do not perceive any of the
controls as being unnatural.
The proposed new type of experiment aims at improving the prediction
power of field experiments. In the field of online auctions, e.g., Ocken-
fels (2005) and Garratt et al. (2004) pursue the same objective. Ockenfels
(2005), conducted only a one-shot field experiment on eBay, by selling arti-
ficial goods to subjects registered on eBay, whose valuations were induced.
Garratt et al. (2004) recruited experienced eBay traders and requested them
to bid in second-price sealed bid auctions with induced valuations. The auc-
tions were conducted on the Internet, but neither on the eBay platform nor
in a controlled environment.
The design of previous field experiments on online auctions did not allow
to study BIN price setting behavior of sellers, because the experimental auc-
tions were set up by the experimenters and not by the subjects. For example,
Durham et al. (2004) study the impact of buyer reputation, seller reputation,
and the magnitude of the BIN price on buyer behavior.
Ivanova-Stenzel and Kröger (2005) study sellers’ BIN price setting behavior
in a conventional lab experiment. Contradicting the theoretical predictions
under risk neutrality, they observe a high number of transactions at the
BIN price, caused by low price offers by the sellers or acceptance of too high
prices by the buyers. Whereas buyers’ deviating behavior could be explained
by risk aversion, seller behavior, especially the significant amount of too low
price offers, remains a puzzle.
Our experimental design allows to study seller behavior in a field environ-
ment. Our aim is to examine whether the puzzle observed in conventional
lab auctions extends to online auctions. We investigate sellers’ BIN price
setting decisions, taking into account the effect of buyer behavior on eBay,
experience with the eBay market platform, learning during the experiment,
and risk aversion. To that aim, we also elicit traders’ risk aversion by simple
lottery choice experiments, as introduced in Holt and Laury (2002).
We find that the phenomenon of sellers setting too low BIN prices does not
vanish when the transactions take place in a real world market environ-
ment. The majority of buyers’ decisions on the BIN price are rational, but
deviations are mostly towards acceptance of too high prices. In the auc-
tions, buyers systematically underbid their value. Experience with trading
on eBay does not reduce the non-optimal price setting. Adaptation of BIN
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price setting during the experiment indicates that “mislearning” from pre-
viously conducted transactions might even lead sellers away from optimal
prices. Finally, a comparison of our results to those of the lab experiment
by Ivanova-Stenzel and Kröger (2005) reveals similarities in the price setting
behavior.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we report some
empirical results on the role of the BIN price in naturally-occurring auctions.
Section 3 reviews the theoretical predictions on price setting behavior in
our experimental auctions. Section 4 spells out the specifics of our novel
experimental design. The results are presented in Section 5. In Section 6,
we present the comparison of our results to those of a conventional lab
experiment. Section 7 concludes.
2 empirical observations
BIN prices have become increasingly popular among buyers and sellers.
eBay.com reports for 2004 that a share of 28% of all transactions have taken
place at the BIN price. Chiu and Cheung (2004) observe that depending on
the product category, between 13% and 60% of newly offered items on eBay
can be bought at a BIN price.
There is a number of empirical papers studying the BIN option on eBay. For
example, in Durham et al. (2004) and Anderson et al. (2004), it has been
found that experienced sellers use the BIN price more frequently and that
BIN price offers of sellers with a high reputation are accepted more fre-
quently. Moreover, the higher the BIN price, the higher is the final sale price.
Both studies have in common that they analyze transactions of goods where
multiple items are offered simultaneously and where a market price (resale
value) is easily recognizable (American Silver Eagle coins and Palm comput-
ers, respectively).
We, however, are interested in private value auctions. Therefore, we col-
lected market data of items where the assumption of independent private
valuations is a reasonable approximation.1 We decided to collect data on an-
tiques, furniture, used music instruments and individual collectibles, goods
with no easily recognizable market value. We justify our choice by the
uniqueness of the items in question and by their low value which, due to
transaction and shipping costs, lets resale seem a rather unlikely option.
We collected data from eBay auctions in March and April 2002. Altogether
we observed 668 items, 199 of which were sold.
Among those items where a BIN price is offered, 33% of sales occur at that
price. The reservation price is 27.4% below the BIN price on average. When
the BIN price is rejected, the reservation price was 31% below the BIN-Price,
compared to 21.7% when it is accepted. This indicates that BIN prices are
1Of course it will always remain an approximation. As Boatwright et al. (2006) highlight,
there is significant disagreement among auction experts in which categories on eBay private
value auctions are to be found.
3
more frequently accepted when an auction is not able to yield substantial
savings. Interestingly, only 8% of the auctions end at a price above the BIN
price. This indicates that rejection decisions by players can be assumed to
be mostly rational.
Moreover, BIN prices are frequently executed towards the end of the auction.
The average time span “saved” by the BIN price is only 2.9 days whereas the
average auction duration is 7 days. The time the BIN option is executed is
very similar to the time where the first bid is submitted (3.05 days before the
auction ends). As we consider auctions for arts, antiques and collectibles,
and as shipping normally takes several days in any case, this suggests that
time preferences play a weak role, if any, in the acceptance decisions. We
often found auctions where the BIN price was even executed on the last day
of the auction.
3 theoretical predictions
We consider a setting with one seller, who sells one indivisible good to one
of two buyers. The buyers have symmetric independent private valuations,
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0,1]. The seller’s reserva-
tion value is zero. In order to model the sequential arrival in online auctions,
we assume that the seller specifies a BIN price which is offered to one of
the buyers, henceforth referred to as buyer 1. If buyer 1 accepts the price,
the transaction is completed. Otherwise, an auction with both buyers takes
place.2 When confronted with the BIN price, buyer 1 thus compares his util-
ity from accepting the BIN price to the expected payoff from participating
in an auction. The seller chooses the BIN price such that his utility is maxi-
mized, anticipating the acceptance decision of buyer 1. Thereby, he has to
take into account that the expected utility from an auction depends on the
BIN price, as in case of a rejection, information about buyer 1’s valuation is
revealed.
If the auction is modelled as a second-price sealed bid auction (as in Ivanova-
Stenzel and Kröger (2005)), true value bidding is a weakly dominant strategy
and buyer 1 faces the following problem when confronted with a BIN price
p:
u(v − p) =
∫ v
0
u(v − x)f(x)dx (1)
Hence, for the case of risk neutrality, a critical valuation above which a price
p is accepted by buyer 1, i.e., the acceptance threshold can be derived as
2Note that the setting can be easily generalized to n bidders and any independent distri-
bution of private values. In an eBay auction, there is always a “bidder 1”, who, by submitting
a bid, can prevent all bidders arriving later from accepting the BIN price.
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v∗(p) =

1−
√
1− 2p if p < 12
1 if p ≥ 12
Thus, BIN prices at or above
1
2 should never be accepted. Solving the sellers’
maximization problem
max
p∈[0,1]
Π
S(p) = p
∫ 1
v∗(p)
f(x)dx +
∫ v∗(p)
0
yg(1)(y,v
∗(p))dy
∫ v∗(p)
0
f(x)dx
(2)
yields optimal BIN prices at or above
1
2 (that are never accepted).
3 Therefore,
sales will always take place in the auction. Ex ante expected earnings are thus
1/3 for the seller and E[v2i /2] = 1/6 for each buyer.
However, the non-existence of transactions at the BIN price derived above
does not hold if buyers and/or sellers are risk averse. In the following, we
assume heterogeneous risk preferences. For our analysis we restrict risk
preferences to belong to the class of constant relative risk aversion4
u(x) =
x(1−α)
1−α
In this case, as shown in Ivanova-Stenzel and Kröger (2005), one cannot ex-
plicitly derive an acceptance threshold. However, we can derive numerical
solutions, including the individual risk aversion parameter for each buyer
and seller, assuming that sellers also know the distribution of risk prefer-
ences among the buyers. In order to derive these numerical solutions for
our case, we elicit individual risk preferences and estimate CRRA parame-
ters for all participants using a lottery choice experiment (see Section 4).
The results from that experiment are used to derive both a distribution of
risk preferences and predictions for individual price setting and acceptance
behavior. We predict BIN prices in the interval [0.45,0.55], and an accep-
tance rate of 18.9%. Since seller risk aversion drives prices down whereas
buyer risk aversion has the opposite effect, the lower bound of the predicted
prices is still close to that predicted under risk neutrality. However, the pre-
diction of no transactions at the BIN prices is not maintained for the case of
heterogeneous risk preferences.
3Thereby, g(1)(y,v
∗(p)) = (1+v∗(p)− 2y)/v∗(p) is the density function of the min-
imum value (the first order statistic) for the cdf G(x) = x/v∗(p) when either one or both
bidders’ valuations lie in the interval [0, v∗(p)].
4This specification implies risk loving behavior for α < 0, risk neutrality for α = 0 and
risk aversion for α > 0. When α = 1, the natural logarithm, u(x) = ln(x), is used.
By assuming CRRA, we can compare our findings to the existing results e.g. in Goeree et
al. (2003) or Holt and Laury (2002).
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This result is in line with findings reported in the literature. For exam-
ple, Mathews (2002), Katzman and Mathews (2002), Reynolds and Wooders
(2004) and Budish and Takeyama (2001) develop models in which the use of
BIN prices can be part of an equilibrium when either sellers or buyers are risk
averse, albeit modelling either the bidder arrival or the auction mechanism
differently.
Since in our experiment we use the eBay platform, our auctions can obviously
not be considered as second price sealed–bid auctions. Still, as Ockenfels
and Roth (2003) show, bidding more than one’s own valuation is a weakly
dominated strategy. Further, there is no longer any dominant strategy. How-
ever, it is shown that all equilibria involve bidding the true valuation at some
point in time. Differences in the resulting prices may only occur because last
minute bids have a positive probability of being lost. On the other hand, if
this probability is negligible and if late bidders have already submitted sev-
eral bids earlier such that their final bid is already substantially above the
minimum bid, the presented second price sealed bid auction model can be
used for deriving reasonable predictions for seller revenue in eBay auctions.
In comparison to Ockenfels (2005) and Ockenfels and Roth (2003), our de-
sign allows to observe bids arriving too late5 and thus to compute the risk of
a last minute bid being lost. This probability is indeed low in our experiment
(in 5% of the cases where a bidder has submitted bids in the last 30 seconds
of the auction, one of these bids arrived too late) and there is a significant
amount of multiple bidding (on average each bidder submitted 4.2 bids per
auction6).
Nevertheless, there are other reasons why final prices in eBay auctions may
be below the second highest valuation. For example, Ockenfels and Roth
(2002) introduce “naive incremental bidding” as a possible off–equilibrium
strategy: A bidder who adopts this strategy always tries to be the high bid-
der until their valuation is reached. Thus, the bidder only raises his bid
after being outbid, and only as much as needed to become the high bidder
again. This strategy is obviously vulnerable to last minute bidding. If such
an “incremental” bidder loses the auction his final bid (and thus the price)
may be below his valuation. They also conjecture that subjects may wrongly
perceive eBay auctions as first-price English auctions.7 Both effects reduce
the seller’s expected auction revenue. Thus, the seller must take into ac-
count these effects when computing the optimal BIN price. Therefore, BIN
prices below 0.45, the lower bound of the predicted price interval, may be
optimal. More specifically, if the expected price in an auction is only γvl,
where γ ∈ [0,1] and vl the second highest valuation, and if the object is still
allocated to the bidder with the highest valuation, the acceptance threshold
for buyer 18 can be derived from
5As we describe in more detail in section 4, in our experiment the time to submit bids
in an eBay auction was 5 minutes.
6Among those who submitted bids too late, the average number of bids is even 8.3.
7This means that they are unaware of eBay’s proxy bidding system and think that in
case of winning they have to pay the maximum bid they submit.
8Buyer 1 is still assumed to decide rationally.
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u(v − p) =
∫ v
0
u(v − γx)f(x)dx (3)
Under risk neutrality, it can be shown that for BIN prices in the interval[
γ
2 ,
1
4−2γ
]
, there are two threshold values, a lower and an upper one. Buyer
1 accepts the BIN price if his valuation is between these thresholds. The
lower threshold v∗ and the upper threshold v∗ can be derived as
v∗(p) =
1−
√
1− 4p + 2γp
2− γ
v∗(p) = min
{
1,
1+
√
1− 4p + 2γp
2− γ
}
Note that given the observed underbidding in our experiment (γ = 0.865),
the upper threshold is only relevant for BIN prices in a very narrow interval
[0.43,0.44].
Solving the maximization problem of the seller leads to an optimal BIN price
of 0.43. The predicted acceptance rate is 23%.
Combining the estimated risk preferences with the observed underbidding
in our experiment we predict BIN prices in the range of [0.43, 0.51], and an
acceptance rate of 25%.
Risk Underbidding BIN Price Acceptance Avg. Transaction
Preferences* Rate Price
RN No [0.5, 1] 0% 0.33
Yes 0.43 23% 0.29
RP No [0.45,0.55] 19% 0.34
Yes [0.43,0.51] 25% 0.30
*RN refers to the risk neutrality assumption and RP to the inclusion of the
measured risk preferences
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions
Table 1 summarizes our theoretical predictions. The bottom line is that BIN
prices below 0.43 cannot be explained by any variant of the model. Only in
the baseline case (risk neutrality, no underbidding), all sales are predicted
to take place in the auction. Given the estimated CRRA parameters, prices
increase slightly when risk preferences are included.
Finally, we mention that there are other attempts of explaining transactions
at the BIN price in equilibrium. E.g., Bose and Daripa (2006) show that posted
price selling followed by an auction with a temporary buy-now option im-
plements the optimal mechanism if buyers’ valuations are discontinuous.
Mathews (2004) and Montgomery et al. (2004) explain BIN transactions by
assuming time preferences or bidding cost. With our experimental design,
we can exclude these explanations.
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4 experimental design and procedure
4.1 Preparation of the Experiment
The first step in the recruitment process was a survey that we conducted
among all students that were registered in our experimental database. We
asked all 900 students whether they had a valid eBay account and how often
they had bought or sold items on eBay in the past. About 170 students
replied. Among those students, who were mainly undergraduate economics
and business students, we recruited our 120 subjects. We made sure that
all of them possessed a valid eBay account which they had registered before
we started the recruitment process.9
Before each experimental session, we prepared 24 auctions, using four eBay
accounts, licensed to the experimenters. We made sure that all seller ac-
counts were similar with respect to the number of reputation points. In
each auction, we offered one used book.10 We described each item briefly,
and included a reference number, consisting of letters and numbers, in the
name of the item. The reserve price was set to eBay’s minimum reserve price
of one Euro. The BIN price was not specified yet.
4.2 Experimental Procedure
As mentioned before, we used the eBay platform to conduct the experiment.
Nevertheless the controlled environment was maintained since during the
whole experiment all traders were present in the laboratory. Buyers used
their existing eBay accounts. Sellers did not use their own accounts. They
had to enter their decision on the BIN price manually on a paper, featuring
a screen shot of the eBay page (see the screen shot in Appendix B). The ac-
tual auctions were then conducted using the experimenters’ accounts (see
above). The aim of this procedure was to avoid the address exchange be-
tween subjects that would normally have taken place after completed trans-
actions. Moreover, we wanted to eliminate the possible influence of sellers’
reputation scores on buyer behavior. For all activities on eBay we used a
fictitious currency, termed eBay-Euro, with 5 eBay-Euros being equivalent to
1 real Euro.
Altogether we ran seven sessions with 12 participants each. Due to technical
problems during the first two sessions we decided to drop them from the
data analysis.11
9This did not necessarily imply that they had already completed a transaction. However,
we think that subjects who have registered at eBay, are somewhat familiar with the trading
system.
10We chose mostly economics books or software books because we wanted to avoid
distortions by fun bidders. These books really existed, such that we did not distort the
eBay marketplace. If an external bidder would have decided to acquire one of the books
we would have been able to complete the transaction correctly. However, no other bidders
submitted bids on our books.
11For example, in the first session, the Internet connection was so slow that some behav-
ior observed in real online auctions (e.g. multiple bidding) would not have been possible.
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Before each session, we randomly drew values for each buyer and each item.
All buyers’ values were drawn independently from the commonly known set
{1, 1.5, 2,....,50}, with all values being equally likely.
Each session consisted of six auction rounds. Upon arrival in the lab, par-
ticipants were provided detailed instructions (see Appendix A) and were
informed whether they would act as sellers or as buyers throughout the
whole experiment. The sellers were also given a sheet containing the refer-
ence number of all of their items, such that they were able to observe the
proceeding of the auction at any time, without using their account.
At the beginning of each round, the sellers received the decision sheets men-
tioned above, on which they had to specify a BIN price in the set {1, 1.5, 2,....,
50}. In order to keep the roles anonymous, we distributed blank sheets to
the buyers. All subjects had to return the sheets after two minutes. The
experimenters completed the prepared auctions with the BIN prices chosen
by the sellers and started the auctions.
In each round, the trading group (1 seller and 2 buyers) were randomly de-
termined. Thus, in each round there were four buyers acting as buyer 1, who
could decide on the BIN price, and four buyers acting as buyer 2, who could
only participate in case the BIN price was rejected. Each buyer acted as buyer
1 in three (of the six) rounds. To avoid unnecessary path dependencies, there
was no more than one trading group consisting of the same subjects acting
as seller and buyer 1. Moreover, two buyers were not matched into the same
trading group more than once.
When all auctions were started and appeared on eBay, i.e., they could be
found by entering the reference number into the eBay search engine, we
informed buyer 1 about their auction’s reference number and their value
for it. This buyer had to either submit a bid or to accept the posted BIN
price within two minutes.
After all subjects acting as buyer 1 had made their decisions, we informed
buyer 2 about their valuations and the items’ reference numbers. If the
auction had not ended at the “Buy-It-Now” price, both bidders had now five
minutes to bid on the item. A clock was projected on the wall, counting down
seconds to the end of the auction. We adjusted this clock to the official eBay
time12 and fixed the auction end time. Any bids who arrived later than this
given time were not considered. The aim of the chosen auction duration was
to enable participants to submit multiple bids, because this is frequently
observed in eBay auctions. At the same time, it was short enough to exclude
time preferences as a possible reason for accepting BIN prices. By using the
reference number of the items both buyers and sellers were able to observe
the auction at any time.
We asked all our participants not to rate the sellers after the auction and
promised not to rate the participants ourselves.
12http://cgi1.ebay.de/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?TimeShow&ssPageName=home:f:f:DE
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4.3 Follow-Up Experiment
At the end of each session, subjects participated in a follow-up lottery exper-
iment which was designed similarly to the one discussed in Holt and Laury
(2002). In this experiment, subjects had to choose among 10 pairs of lotter-
ies, determined by the probability to win a high or a low amount of money.
Among each pair of lotteries, the probability of winning the higher amount
was equal, but the amounts were different. Each pair consisted of a risky
lottery, in which the low amount was e0.20 and the high amount e8.20. In
the less risky lottery, the amounts were e4.00 and e5.00. From lottery pairs
1 to 10, the probabilities of winning the high amount increased from 10%
to 100%. More details on the lottery choices can be found in Appendix C.
We designed the stakes such that they were similar to the range of possible
earnings in an eBay transaction.
We are aware that there is critique, e.g. the one by Heinemann (2003), say-
ing that lottery experiments cannot measure risk aversion without taking
subjects’s wealth into account. We notice that this critique does not apply
to our setting, because our aim is not to elicit utility functions of the sub-
jects but rather to compare estimated levels of risk aversion from BIN price
acceptance decisions to the level exhibited in lottery choices. We thus are
not interested in subjects’ overall risk aversion but only in risk averse be-
havior in our experiment. The reason is that the external wealth level of a
subject is the same both in the auction and in the lottery experiment. Of
course, earnings in auctions could influence behavior in the lottery exper-
iment. However, Holt and Laury (2002) have not found evidence for such
level effects.
Another possible criticism might be that conducting the lottery experiment
after the auction experiment biases the choice behavior. Goeree et al. (2003)
have conducted lottery choice experiments before and after their main ex-
periment. Their results show that such order effects are negligible.
4.4 Payment
Within some days after the experiment, subjects could collect their earn-
ings at the institute. At that occasion, one of the lotteries was determined
by rolling a die. The lottery was then played by another roll of the die.
Subjects received both their payoff from the auctions and from the lottery
experiment. Subjects’ total earnings ranged between e9.40 to e36.40 with a
mean of e22.06. Thereby, the average earnings from the eBay transactions
was e17.19. These amounts include a lump sum payment of 6 Euros for the
buyers.
5 results
Altogether, we collected data from 120 auctions, with 60 participants (20
sellers and 40 buyers). As buyers and sellers were re-matched every round,
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observations within treatments are not independent. We thus have n = 5
independent observations.
A first overview on the results is given in Table 2. For ease of comparison
to the theoretical model we report our results for normalized valuations,
i.e., all experimental outcomes are transformed into the [0,1]–range. The
average BIN price is 0.5. Profits of sellers and buyers are also quite close to
the predictions of the baseline model (risk neutrality and no underbidding).
However, in 36% of the transactions, the BIN price was accepted, and thus
there was no auction. This rate increases to 60% if one only considers the
cases where buyer 1’s valuation is above the BIN price. Average BIN prices
and acceptance rates do not change substantially over time.
In 87% of the transactions, the outcome is efficient. Considering auction
transactions only, the share of efficient allocations is 94%.
Price Offer Acc. Profits
Rate Sellers Buyers
Period N Avg. (SD) (in %) Avg. (SD) Avg. (SD)
1 20 0.51 (0.17) 50 0.37 (0.15) 0.18 (0.23)
2 20 0.50 (0.16) 35 0.31 (0.19) 0.15 (0.25)
3 20 0.54 (0.17) 30 0.36 (0.21) 0.13 (0.2)
4 20 0.50 (0.17) 35 0.32 (0.16) 0.17 (0.21)
5 20 0.48 (0.17) 35 0.30 (0.21) 0.18 (0.24)
6 20 0.49 (0.19) 30 0.32 (0.16) 0.15 (0.21)
all 120 0.50 (0.17) 36 0.33 (0.18) 0.16 (0.23)
Table 2: Overview on Results
Figure 1 reports the distribution of the BIN prices. The most frequently set
single price is 0.5 (16 offers), followed by 0.4 (12 offers). Notably, 47% of all
BIN prices are below the baseline prediction of 0.5. On the individual level,
20% of the sellers always set BIN prices below 0.5 whereas 25% constantly
set prices above.
Figure 2 looks at seller revenue. It shows that the higher the BIN price the
higher the revenue. Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is
highly significant (ρ = 0.33, p = 0.00).13
Result 1 Almost half of the BIN prices are below 0.5. BIN prices and seller
revenues are significantly positive correlated.
In the following, we investigate into the effects of buyer behavior on eBay,
risk aversion, experience with the eBay market platform, and learning during
the experiment on sellers’ BIN price setting decisions.
13One exception are very high prices. However, this result must be handled with care, as
only one subject set constantly BIN prices close to 1.
11
Figure 1: BIN prices
Figure 2: Seller’s profits
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5.1 Buyer Behavior
In each auction, buyer 1 has to decide whether to accept the BIN price or not.
As a first approach, we compare the respective buyer’s payoff from accepting
the BIN price and his expected payoff from participating in the auction. If we
assume that the buyer is risk neutral, believes that his opponent bids his true
value in the auction, and also plans to do this, 85% of all acceptance/rejection
decisions are optimal. If we only count complex decisions, i.e. those where
the decider’s valuation did not lie below the BIN price, we get a value of
76%. A closer look at the complex decisions shows that irrationality has
an interesting pattern. Whereas rejection decisions are rational in 86% of
the cases, acceptance decisions are rational in only 69% of the cases. This
indicates that rejections occur almost always in cases where the expected
payoff from acceptance would have been lower than the payoff from the
auction. Subjects thus seem not to have a preference for participating in
an auction. On the other hand, acceptance decisions can also be observed
when the expected payoff from an auction is higher than the payoff from
BIN acceptance. As we discuss in more detail in the next subsection, one
possible explanation for this pattern is risk aversion.
Since we observed underbidding (see below), expecting a price 13.5% below
the loser’s valuation, would be rational. Modifying the analysis in that way,
our findings on the rationality of acceptance/rejection decisions are con-
firmed. We get 70% of rational decisions, (86% rational rejections, but only
59% rational acceptances).
Result 2 The majority of buyers’ decisions are rational assuming risk neu-
trality. However, the deviations from the predicted decisions seem to be sys-
tematically biased towards acceptance.
Bidding should (theoretically) not be influenced either by the existence and
rejection of the BIN price nor by buyers’ risk attitudes since bidding the own
value is an equilibrium strategy in any case. We find that only 19% among
the losing bids were equal to the bidder’s valuation, increasing to 36% in the
last round. Considering bids within a range of 0.05 around the valuation,
we get 64% and 73%, respectively.14 In contrast to the repeated findings of
overbidding in second price sealed bid auctions in lab experiments, we find
that 65% of the price determining bids are below bidders’ valuation 15. On
average, the price determining bid was 13.5% below the respective valuation.
The average number of bids per bidder and auction was 4.2. There was thus
a significant amount of multiple bidding. The multiple and underbidding
may support the hypothesis that eBay auctions are perceived as first price
auctions by some bidders (see, e.g., Ockenfels and Roth (2003)) who thus
bid more carefully, as found, e.g., in Kagel et al. (1987).
14Note that for the selling price in an auction, only the losing bid is relevant, since it
determines the price.
15In fact, there was only one bid that was more than 0.05 above the bidder’s valuation
13
Similar to what can be observed in (real) eBay auctions, we observed a lot
of ’sniping’, i.e., bidding shortly (in the last 30 seconds) before the auction
ends. Obviously people did not play our auctions as recommended by eBay
(bid your willingness to pay early16) or as a standard second price auction.
In 75% of the auctions, bids were submitted in the last 30 seconds. Interest-
ingly, sniping seems to increase the winners’ payoff on average. Whereas in
auctions without last minute bidding, the winner roughly pays a price equal
to the predicted one (4.6% below the theoretical prediction), in auctions with
sniping, the realized price is lower (16.4% below the theoretical prediction).
A reason for this may not be equilibrium behavior, but rather the fact that
sniping is an optimal reaction to naive incremental bidding, as shown by
Ockenfels and Roth (2003).
The observation is confirmed by a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: We compared
session averages for relative deviations of the realized price from the theo-
retically predicted price. We get p = 0.063 in a two-tailed test.
Result 3 There is a lot of multiple bidding, underbidding as well as sniping.
Sniping leads to higher profits for buyers on average.
5.2 The Role of Risk Aversion
As mentioned before, we elicited subjects’ risk preferences using a lottery
choice experiment. We exclude 5 out of the 60 subjects whose choices are
inconsistent.17 Assuming constant relative risk aversion, we estimate an av-
erage risk aversion parameter of 0.24 for the sellers and 0.18 for the buyers.
Following the classification introduced in Holt and Laury (2002), we find that
only 6 of 55 players are very or highly risk averse, (α > 0.68). The largest
fraction of subjects (26) can be classified as risk averse or slightly risk averse
(0.68 ≥ α > 0.15) and 13 subjects as risk neutral (0.15 ≥ α > −0.15). Fi-
nally, 10 subjects are classified as risk loving (−0.15 ≥ α > −0.49). In other
experiments, e.g., Goeree et al. (2003) and Cox and Oaxaca (1996) average
estimated risk aversion parameters ranged from 0.28 to 0.67, depending on
the task.18
A high fraction 73% of BIN prices is outside the range of predicted BIN prices
given the observed underbidding in the auction and the risk aversion esti-
mates for sellers and buyers (0.43 to 0.51). Thereby, most deviations are to
prices that are too low. Especially, 35% are at or below 0.4, which cannot
be explained either by any parameter of risk aversion observed among our
16This recommendation can be found on all European and the North American eBay
website, e.g., on eBay.com at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/outbid-ov.html
17For these subjects, it was impossible to determine a risk aversion parameter because
they switched from the safe to the risky lottery or vice versa more than once.
18Apparently, measured risk aversion turns out to be higher when elicited from more
complex tasks. For example, Cox and Oaxaca (1996) elicited risk aversion parameters
from behavior in first price auctions (estimated RA parameter of 0.67), whereas Goeree
et al. (2003) used lottery choice experiments similar to ours (estimated RA parameter of
0.28).
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sellers, or by the observed underbidding in the auctions. There is also no
correlation between risk aversion and BIN price setting. Finally, we observe
a much higher fraction of BIN transactions (36%) compared to the predicted
25%. We thus find that overall, risk aversion is not a good explanation for
observed seller behavior.
Concerning the buyer side, when we incorporate the individual risk aver-
sion parameters into the model, we still have approximately the same rate
of rational acceptance/rejection decisions (83%). However, the deviations
become much more “symmetric”: The fraction of rational acceptance and
rejection decisions become more similar (76% and 68%, only considering
the “complex decisions”). This shows that incorporating risk aversion does
increase the explanatory power of the theory concerning acceptance deci-
sions, but decreases the rationality of some rejection decisions. If one as-
sumes symmetric error making of subjects, this can thus explain some of
the behavior of the buyers. However, explanatory power is reduced if un-
derbidding is included into the analysis: The rate of rational acceptance
decisions decreases to 67% whereas rational rejection decisions are at 75%.
This shows that buyer behavior is still slightly biased towards overly fre-
quent acceptance.
Result 4 Risk aversion can only partly help in explaining buyer behavior. It
performs badly in predicting price setting behavior.
5.3 The Role of Experience with trading on eBay
Since we used a real auction platform, we were able to observe participants’
prior experience on eBay by their reputation scores. Our participants were
differently experienced: They had reputation scores of 0 to 194 with an av-
erage of 23 and had previously completed 29 eBay transactions on average,
thereof 6 as a seller and 23 as a buyer.
Figure 3 shows a box plot of all set BIN prices for each of the 20 sellers, sorted
by their experience with selling on eBay. As one can see, more experience
does not have a systematic influence on price setting behavior. Both sellers
with no selling experience and sellers having previously sold 20 or more
items, vary their BIN prices substantially. Only half of the sellers who kept
their prices rather constant have conducted more than 10 previous sales.
Comparing the median BIN prices of each seller to the individual predicted
BIN price (given the CRRA parameters), we find that more selling experience
does not lead to an improved fit of the theoretical predictions.
We find that experience has some impact on the bidding behavior. Con-
sidering rather inexperienced subjects (less than 10 eBay transactions), the
average (losing) bid is 19% below the valuation, whereas among more ex-
perienced subjects, the bid is only 7% below valuation.19 This difference is
significant (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, based on session averages, p=0.043,
19This supports the hypothesis of “naive incremental bidding”, which is apparently more
pronounced among unexperienced subjects.
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Figure 3: BIN Prices and eBay Experience
two-tailed). Moreover, the rate of ’snipe bids’ not arriving in time goes down
from 11% for unexperienced bidders to 4% for experienced bidders. Finally,
taking individual averages, we find a weak negative relation between experi-
ence on eBay and the number of bids per auction. Both the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient are negative,
but not significantly so.
Result 5 We find no systematic relation between experience and BIN price
setting. However, there are differences in the bidding behavior between expe-
rienced and unexperienced subjects. Experienced bidders bid in a seemingly
more sophisticated way.
5.4 Learning During the Experiment
One advantage of our design compared to other field auction experiments is
that we can conduct more than one round and hence study changes in behav-
ior over time. This allows us to investigate if and how subjects learn during
the experiment. Besides the analysis of the absolute level of BIN prices, we
are also interested in investigating the adaptation of the price levels during
the experiment. Our conjecture is that learning to set BIN prices optimally
is rather difficult. Sellers who start with low BIN prices might observe that
they make higher gains in BIN transactions than in auctions and thus form
false expectations about the prospects of an auction. A seller who offers low
16
BIN prices is more likely to experience lower profits in the auction: buyers
with relatively high values might accept low prices, but buyers who cannot
even afford those low price offers, reject and go to the auction. This leads to
the selection of low value buyers into the auction and consequently to low
auction prices, reinforcing seller’s expectation about low prospects of the
auction.20 Sellers who reason this way forgo profit opportunities. This is
clearly confirmed by the data. The average BIN transaction yields a payoff of
0.4 whereas the average auction only yields 0.26. This leads to the hypothe-
sis that earnings in the previous round may have an influence on BIN setting
behavior. Therefore, we calculated coefficients for the correlation between
previous round earnings when there was an auction and BIN price setting in
the subsequent round.
The Pearson coefficient for the correlation between the previous round earn-
ings if there was an auction and the adaption of the BIN price (0 when the
BIN price is kept constant by the subject) is 0.33, which is significant on the
1-%-level. Using Spearman’s ρ, we get a coefficient of 0.34, also significant
on the 1-%-level. Thus, the more a subject earns in an auction, the more
they increase the BIN price in the next round. This is robust to replacing the
change by the level of the BIN price or to including all transactions, not only
auction transactions.
Considering individual behavior, we find that only 3 subjects exhibit a sig-
nificantly positive correlation between previous round earnings and the BIN
price adaption in the subsequent period (Spearman rank correlation coef-
ficient, at 5%-level), 14 have an insignificant positive correlation and 3 an
insignificant negative correlation.
Result 6 There is evidence for “mislearning”: The lower a BIN price is set,
the less a seller earns when an auction takes place. Transactions at the BIN
price are therefore incorrectly perceived as more desirable. Thus sellers tend
to lower their BIN prices after unsuccessful auctions, resulting in foregoing
profit opportunities.
6 comparison with the results of a standard lab experiment
Although conducted in the lab, subjects in our experiment do not only bring
experience with and knowledge of the experimental task, but also act in the
environment in which this experience was acquired. Therefore, we can in-
vestigate in which way behavior in such an experiment differs from behavior
in standard lab experiments.
In the following, we compare our results concerning seller behavior to those
of the lab experiment by Ivanova-Stenzel and Kröger (2005). As mentioned
20Charness and Levin (2005) discussed the fact that bayesian updating fails when it
clashes with reinforcement learning. In a comparable way to their decision situations,
subjects in our experiment may fail to realize that a profitable BIN transaction reveals
good market conditions, i.e. that an auction or an even higher BIN price would have been
likely to yield higher revenue.
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above, in their standard lab experiment, sellers offer a BIN price to one of
two buyers. If this price is not accepted, a second price sealed bid auction
takes place.
It was observed that differently to our eBay auctions, in the lab experiment
bidders submitted bids close to their valuations. Although the bidding pro-
cedure (and the bidding behavior) in our eBay auctions is not as in a second
price sealed bid auction, as discussed in Section 3, the predictions concern-
ing the BIN prices without underbidding can be used. Therefore, a compar-
ison of the seller behavior in the two frameworks is meaningful.
Table 3 summarizes the results of both experiments. We observe that in
both experimental settings, roughly one third of all trades occur at the BIN
price. Furthermore, average price offers, seller and buyer profits are strik-
ingly similar.
Acceptance Sellers’ Buyers’
Price offer Rate Profits Profits
Format N Avg. (SD) in % Avg. (SD) Avg (SD)
Lab 960 0.51 (0,17) 33 0.33 (0.19) 0.15 (0.22)
eBay 120 0.50 (0.17) 36 0.33 (0.18) 0.16 (0.22)
Table 3: Comparison Between eBay and Lab Results
Figure 4 reports the cumulated density function of BIN prices set by the
sellers in both experiments and shows that the price setting behavior of
subjects in the lab resembles quite closely the behavior on eBay.
Using a Mann-Whitney-U test, we check whether average BIN prices differ in
both experiments on the session level.21 We cannot reject the hypotheses of
identical means (p = 1). A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test shows that BIN price
distributions in both experiments are not significantly different (p=0.19).
Figure 4 indicates that in both experiments a large fraction of sellers set BIN
prices substantially below 0.5, inconsistent with the risk neutral predictions.
More specifically, 52% of BIN prices are below 0.5 in the lab, and 47% in the
eBay experiment. Furthermore, in both experiments, we observe substantial
fractions of BIN prices below the lower bound of the predicted price ranges
(37.5% on eBay and 29% in the lab).
Only 25% of the sellers constantly set BIN prices at or above 0.5 in the eBay
experiment whereas 20% constantly set prices below. These numbers cannot
be compared easily to the lab experiment, as that experiment consisted of
32 periods. Drawing 6 random trading periods per seller, we get 20% of
sellers setting BIN prices above 0.5 and 10% constantly setting prices below
0.5, respectively.
In the previous section, we have mentioned that “mislearning” might play a
role in explaining seller behavior. This can also be found in the data from the
21In both experiments, one session defines one independent observation.
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Figure 4: CDF of set BIN prices
lab experiment. We find that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient be-
tween previous round earnings and the BIN price adaption in the subsequent
period is significantly positive (on the 5%-level, 1-tailed) for 12 out of the 30
sellers. Another 16 subjects exhibit an insignificant positive correlation and
only 2 a (insignificant) negative correlation. An important precondition for
“wrong learning” is that subjects do not realize the relation between rejected
BIN prices and low earnings in an auction. To check whether subjects recog-
nize that the expected profit from an auction is lower when a BIN price below
0.5 is rejected, beliefs concerning the expected profits were elicited in the
lab experiment: In 5 of the 10 sessions, this belief was elicited before sellers
learn buyer 1’s decision, but after the seller had specified a BIN price; in the
other 5 sessions this belief was only elicited after the BIN price was rejected.
The results indicate that most of the sellers do not update their beliefs after
rejection of the BIN price. The average expected profit is 0.34, regardless
at which time the expectations are elicited.22 Whereas 0.34 is close to the
theoretical and to the realized profit in the whole mechanism, it represents
a strong overestimation of the profits in auctions after the BIN price is re-
jected. Actually, theoretical and actual profits are overestimated by 0.08 on
average, which is more than 27%.
Result 7 Despite the differences in the auction formats and, consequently, in
the bidding behavior, price setting behavior is similar in both environments.
22We excluded expectations of 0 and 1 from the data, as they were obviously submitted
by non-serious players. However, including them does not change the qualitative results.
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Using a more realistic trading institution does not lead to an improved fit of
the theory. “Mislearning” seems to occur in both environments.
7 conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we introduce a new type of experiment that brings the field
into the lab. We have applied this type of experiment to study BIN price
setting behavior of sellers in online auctions.
We observe that 37.5% of the BIN prices are too low to be explained by any of
the presented theoretical predictions. This non-optimal seller behavior re-
duces revenue compared to higher prices. A possible reason is the observed
“mislearning”. Sellers tend to lower their BIN prices after unsuccessful auc-
tions, resulting in foregoing profit opportunities. Experience with trading
on eBay does not prevent sellers from setting prices non-optimally.
The majority of buyers’ decisions are rational assuming risk neutrality. How-
ever, the deviations from the predicted decisions seem to be systematically
biased towards acceptance. Risk aversion can only partly help in explain-
ing buyer behavior. Experience with the eBay platform influences bidding
behavior. Experienced bidders bid in a seemingly more sophisticated way.
A comparison of our experimental results with results from a standard lab
experiment reveals no significant differences in the price setting behavior.
Using a more realistic trading institution does not lead to an improved fit of
the theory.
Although we excluded the possible role of time preferences, our results re-
semble the findings from the empirical data presented in Section 2. For ex-
ample, there is a significant share of transactions (approximately one third)
at the BIN price and a similar fraction of auctions ends below the (rejected)
BIN price.
We are aware that the applied experimental design and procedure still con-
tain a number of artificial elements. For example, sellers could not use their
own eBay account. A bidding period of only 5 minutes is different from the
bidding period in an eBay auction. The number of bidders and the distribu-
tion of their values is known. However, our design still maintains the main
characteristics of trading on eBay and thus enables subjects to use their ex-
perience from the real world trading institution. The shortened duration of
the auction allows to study repeated interactions and to shed more light on
last minute bidding and the associated risk of bids being lost.
Our results show that lab experiments are still a reasonable tool to study
auction behavior. On the other hand, bringing a field market institution
into the lab helps to detect specific features of behavior in the environment
to be studied that may be missed otherwise.
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A translated instructions
Please read the instructions carefully! Should you have any questions please
raise your hand; we will answer your questions personally. The following
instructions are the same for all participants. This experiment consists of
two independent parts. In the first part of the experiment, you participate
in eBay auctions. Three people (one seller and two buyers) take part in the
purchase of an item in each of these auctions. Your role (buyer or seller)
is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment. You keep your
role throughout the experiment. All amounts will be provided in an exper-
imental currency, the eBay-Euro. At the beginning of each auction, each
buyers’ valuation for the item is determined. If you are a buyer, you will be
informed about your valuation by the experimenters. Valuations are ran-
domly drawn from the interval 1 to 50 eBay-Euro with an incremental unit
of 0,50 eBay-Euro, i.e., 1,00; 1,50; 2,00; 2,50;...; 49,00; 49,50; 50,00. All of
these values are equally likely. The valuations of the two buyers are inde-
pendent from each other, i.e. they are usually different. Each buyer knows
his/her own valuation but not the one of the other buyer. The seller is not
informed about any of them. Each auction will be proceed as follows: At the
beginning of the auction, the seller determines a “Buy-it-Now price” for the
item. Only values that are divisible by 0.50 eBay-Euro and lie between 1 and
50 eBay-Euro are allowed, i.e., 1,00; 1,50; 2,00; 2,50;…; 49,00; 49,50; 50,00.
The starting price of the auction is 1 eBay-Euro. Then, one of the buyers will
decide, knowing his/her valuation, if s/he wants to purchase the item at the
“Buy-it-Now price” or not. ’ If the buyer accepts the “Buy-it-Now price”, the
item is sold at this price and the auction is over. The (net) payoff to the buyer
is the difference between his/her valuation and the price. The seller receives
the price paid. The other buyer gets nothing and pays nothing, i.e. his/her
payoff is 0. ’ If the buyer rejects the “Buy-it-Now price”, he must make a
bid in order to initiate a conventional auction, in which the other buyer can
also participate. Both of the buyers can make bids for the product within 5
minutes bidding time. Again, only the bids that are divisible by 0.50 eBay-
Euro and lie between 1 and 50 eBay-Euro are allowed, i.e., 1,00; 1,50; 2,00;
2,50;...; 49,00; 49,50; 50,00. The bidding time will be started and ended by
experimenters with the use of a clock projected on the wall. The end of the
auction is determined according to the projected time, not according to the
time in eBay! The bids that are made after the end of the auction will not
be counted. At the end of 5 minutes bidding time, the buyer who made the
highest bid gets the product at the price at which the auction ends (in accor-
dance with the eBay rules). In case of a tie (when two buyers make the same
bid), the bidder who has made his/her bid earlier gets the item. The auction
is over. The (net) payoff to the buyer is the difference between his/her valu-
ation and the price. The seller receives the price paid. The other buyer gets
nothing and pays nothing, i.e. his/her payoff is 0. The experiment consists
of 6 auctions. In each auction, the seller and two buyers will be randomly
matched. Each buyer will be able to decide on the “Buy-it-Now price” in 3
out of 6 auctions.
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Course of the Experiment:
After being informed whether you are a buyer or a seller, which is indicated
on the sheet “Information about your Role”, please follow the steps V1-
V2 and K1-K2, respectively (according to your role). Please use your own
eBay ID and password to log in. In order to assure the anonymity of the
participants, only the buyers will use their own eBay accounts during the
experiment. Each seller will receive an eBay account from the experimenters
to be used in the experiment. The sellers will find their account information
on the sheet “Information about your Role”. They will not, however, know
the passwords for these accounts and they cannot, hence, use them on their
own. If you are a buyer, please remain logged in. If you are a seller, please
log out from your personal account. Each auction will be prepared and
executed by the experimenters on behalf of the seller (Setting the category
number, product-ID, product description, starting price of 1 eBay-Euro). The
seller must determine a "Buy-it-now price" for each auction and write it down
on the sheet "Decision on Buy-it-now Price", which will be distributed at the
beginning of each auction. After all sellers have decided on their “Buy-it-now
price” , the auctions will start. Now, those buyers who decide on the "Buy-
It-Now price", are informed about their valuation and the relevant item’s
ID from the sheet “Information about your auction”. These buyers should
follow steps K3 and K4 described in “Information about Your Role”. Buyers
who do not decide on the “Buy-it-now price”, will get this information only
when they enter the auction. If you cannot find the product in step K4, make
sure that you have typed the product-ID correctly. If you cannot find the
product even when you enter the ID correctly, this means that the product
has been sold to the first buyer at the “Buy-it-now price”.
Summary: Each auction lasts for a total of 9 minutes: Decision on the “Buy-
it-now price” by the seller: 2 minutes; Decision to buy or not at “Buy-it-now
price” by the first buyer: 2 minutes; In case the “Buy-it-now price” is rejected,
both of the buyers bid in the auction during 5 minutes.
Please don’t make any bids in the auctions after the experiment. Please don’t
rate other participants. Notice that except for the renumeration for your
participation, no claims can be made concerning the auctions. We would like
to also inform you that all eBay rules are valid for this experiment as well;
for instance, if you are a buyer, your address might be communicated to the
experimenters after the experiment (as the actual owner of seller accounts).
We commit to ensuring that this information will not be disclosed to third
parties and that it will not be kept or used after the experiment.
Rules regarding the Payments: The exchange rate is: 1 eBay-Euro = e0,20.
After the experiment you will receive your payoff (in e) from all auctions.
You can get your payment any time between 10:00 and 12:00 am starting
from 23.01.2006 in room 121 at the Institute of Economic Theory I. Please be
aware that a buyer might incur losses! This can happen, if a buyer accepted
a “buy-it-now price” or made a bid during the auction, which was higher than
his valuation. Buyers are granted an initial payment of e6. Should you, as a
buyer, make losses, they will be deducted from your earnings (or from your
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initial payment). You will get the instructions for the second part of the
experiment after the first part is over.
Instructions for the Second Part of the Experiments:
The following table includes different lotteries. The rows are numbered from
1 to 10. For each row, you must decide whether you prefer lottery A (left
column) or lottery B (right column). Please mark your choice with a cross for
each row. When you come to our institute (Institute for Economic Theory I)
to get your payment for the first experiment, we are going to play one of the
lotteries: we will roll a ten-sided dice twice. The first number will determine
the row number of the table. The lottery that you have chosen for that row
will then be played by rolling the dice for the second time. You will receive
your earnings from the lottery, immediately.
Example: If you roll “5” in the first roll, then the lottery that you have
chosen for row number 5 will be relevant for your earnings. If you roll
“1”,“2”,“3”,“4”, or “5” (with probability 50%) in the second roll, then you will
earn the amount corresponding to those numbers in the relevant lottery (i.e.,
e5 if lottery “A” was chosen during the experiment and e8,20 if lottery “B”
was chosen during the experiment). If you roll “6”,“7”,“8”,“9” or “10” (with
probability 50%) in the second roll, then you will earn the amount corre-
sponding to those numbers in the lottery you have chosen (i.e., e3 if lottery
“A” was chosen and e0,20 if lottery “B” was chosen
23
B screen shot of seller bin price decision
Figure 5: Screen Shot of Seller BIN Price Decision
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C lottery experiment
Subjects could select between 0 and 10 safe choices. Table 4 presents the
appropriate estimated measures of α in equation (3).
Safe Choices α Interval median
0 < −1,523 no median
1 −0,874 > α > −1,523 -1,195
2 −0,477 > α > −0,874 -0,675
3 −0,175 > α > −0,477 -0,33
4 0,083 > α > −0,175 -0,046
5 0,325 > α > 0,083 0,204
6 0,571 > α > 0,325 0,448
7 0,848 > α > 0,571 0,71
8 1,228 > α > 0,848 1,038
9 α > 1,228 no median
10 makes no sense no median
Table 4: Risk aversion estimates
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